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The Balanced Budget/Tax Limitation
Amendment
By DAVID DREIER* and WILLIAM CRAIG STUBBLEBINE**
Introduction
On August 4, 1982, the Senate adopted a proposed constitutional
amendment that would have required Congress to adopt a balanced
budget each year.1 The House of Representatives on October 1, 1982,
rejected a similar measure by a vote of 236 to 187,2 exactly forty-six
votes short of the two-thirds majority of those present and voting re-
quired to propose a constitutional amendment to the states for ratifica-
tion.3 Thus ended the prospects for long range fiscal responsibility
during the Ninety-seventh Congress.
Some may perceive that the final House vote also ended the long
struggle by many members of Congress who, through experience, have
come to realize that existing procedures for discretionary control of the
budget do not work. History suggests, however, that a renewed effort
to restore traditional fiscal "norms" to the current budget process will
be part of the Ninety-eighth Congress.4 In fact, House Joint Resolution
243, introduced by Representatives Conable and Jenkins, and Senate
Joint Resolution 5, introduced by Senators Thurmond and Hatch, both
incorporate provisions similar to those defeated in the last Congress.5
The movement behind the constitutional approach to ensuring fiscal
* United States Congressman (R. California); B.A., 1975, Claremont Men's College;
M.A., 1976, Claremont Graduate School.
** Professor of Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College; Director, Claremont
McKenna College Center for the Study of Law Structures; B.A., 1958, University of Dela-
ware; Ph.D., 1963, University of Virginia.
1. 128 CONG. REC. S9719 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982).
2. 128 CONG. REc. H8256 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
3. U.S. CONST. art. V.
4. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 12, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H46 (daily ed. Jan.
3, 1983); H.R.J. Res. 19, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H47 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983);
H.R.J. Res. 24, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H47 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983); H.R.J.
Res. 27, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H47 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983); H.R.J. Res. 94,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H177 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983).
5. H.R.J. Res. 243, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2250 (daily ed. Apr. 20,
1983); S.I Res. 5, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 595 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983).
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responsibility is rooted deeply in traditional, constitutional, and moral
principles.' It is not, as some have implied, a newly created legislative
device orchestrated by a fiscally responsible minority seeking to impose
its will on a deficit spending majority.'
I. Precis of Balanced Budget Concept
As a Report of the Committee on the Judiciary illustrates in great
detail, "no concept is more a part of traditional American fiscal policy
than that of the balanced budget."8 Statements of principle made by
prominent figures in American political history reflect fiscal "norms"
which were part of the effective constitution through the early part of
the twentieth century.9 This clear national consensus in support of a
balanced budget meant there was little need to focus congressional at-
6. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 10 (J. Buchanan & R.
Wagner eds. 1978).
7. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET-TAx LIMITATION CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28 (1981).
8. Id at 19.
9. Thomas Jefferson: "I [, however,] place economy among the first and most impor-
tant of republican virtues, and public debt as the greatest of the dangers to be feared." L.
KIMMEL, FEDERAL BUDGET AND FISCAL POLICY, 1789-1958, at 14 (1959) (quoting Letter to
Governor William Plumer of New Hampshire (July 21, 1816),printed in 7 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (H. A. Washington ed. 1855)) (insert from original).
Alexander Hamilton: "As the vicissitudes of nations begat a perpetual tendency to the
accumulation of debt, there ought to be a perpetual, anxious, and unceasing effort to reduce
that which at any time exists, as fast as shall be practicable, consistently with integrity and
good faith." (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, a communication to
the House of Representatives on Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in P. STUDENSKI & H. KRoos,
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 55 (1952).
John Adams: "[The] consequences arising from the continual accumulation of public
debts in other countries ought to admonish us to be careful to prevent their growth in our
own." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 12 (quoting 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 243-
44 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
James Madison: "[The duty of Congress is] to liberate the public resources by an hon-
orable discharge of the public debts." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 17 (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 452-53 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
James Monroe: After the elimination of the public debt, the government "would be left
at liberty ... to apply such portions of the revenue as may not be necessary for current
expenses to such other objects as may be most conducive to the public security and welfare."
L. KIMMEL, supra, at 17 (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 823 (J.
Richardson ed. 1897)).
John Quincy Adams: Among the maxims of political economy which the "stewards of
the public moneys should never suffer without urgent necessity to be transcended is that of
keeping the expenditures of the year within the limits of its receipts." L. KIMMEL, supra, at
17 (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 924 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
Andrew Jackson: Once the budget is balanced and the debt paid off, "our population
will be relieved from a considerable portion of its present burthens and will find not only
new motives to patriotic affection, but additional means for the display of individual enter-
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tention on legislation to mandate a balanced budget. It was not until
the mid-thirties that regular discussions on the need to reduce deficits
occurred. The first constitutional amendment to require a balanced
budget was introduced in 1936 by Congressman Harold Knutson of
Minnesota.1 This measure would have established a per capita limita-
tion on the federal public debt during peacetime. Congress could have
created deficits, but only to the extent that the per capita ceiling was not
surpassed."
Following World War II, in 1947, Senator Tydings of Maryland
and Senator Bridges of New Hampshire introduced Senate Joint Reso-
lution 61,12 which was reported out by the Committee on Appropria-
tions but received no further action. 3 In 1949, Senator McClellan
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 131,'1 which was approved unani-
mously.15 This resolution would have required the President to submit
an alternative balanced budget for the 1951 fiscal year. 6 However, this
resolution did not survive conference.
Numerous proposals were introduced during the early 1950's. In
fact, since the Eighty-fourth Congress, an average of four amendments
to the Constitution to require a balanced federal budget has been pro-
posed during each Congress. In addition, numerous statutory propos-
prise." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 19 (quoting 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1014
(J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
Andrew Johnson: "We should look at the national debt just as it is-not as a national
blessing, but as a heavy burden on the industry of the country, to be discharged without
unnecessary delay." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 66 (quoting 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 3564 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
William McKinley: The "Government should not be permitted to run behind or in-
crease its debt." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 78 (quoting 14 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 6237-38 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)).
Woodrow Wilson: "Money being spent without new taxation, and appropriation with-
out accompanying taxation is as bad as taxation without representation." L. KIMMEL, supra
at 85, (quoting Wilson, Taxation andAppropriation, reprinted in THE NATIONAL REVENUES
108 (A. Shaw ed. 1888)).
Calvin Coolidge: "The Nation must make financial sacrifices, accompanied by a stem
self-denial in public expenditures, until we have conquered the disabilities of our public
finance... [We] must keep our budget balanced for each year." L. KIMMEL, supra, at 93
(quoting Annual Message of the President of the United States, 69 CONG. Rc. 103-04 (daily
ed. Dec. 6, 1927)).
10. 80 CONG. REc. 6677 (1936).
11. Id
12. S.J. Res. 61, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 5911 (1947).
13. S. REP. No. 154, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 93 CONG. REc. S4555-57 (1947).
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als were introduced and considered during this period.17
Although the 1960's saw very few proposals to amend the Consti-
tution, new initiatives emerged with the 1970's. In 1973, Representa-
tive Jack Kemp introduced House Joint Resolution 816, which would
have limited federal expenditures and receipts to a percentage of the
previous year's national income.'8 In 1979, Representatives Barber
Conable and Ed Jenkins introduced House Joint Resolution 395, which
would have limited the growth of federal outlays to the growth in gross
national product. 19 On the Senate side, John Heinz and Richard Stone
introduced a measure similar to the two House Joint Resolutions, but
their joint resolution died in subcommittee."z
These examples illustrate the nascent concern over the absence of
fiscal prudence in the last thirty years. Since 1950, the budget has been
balanced only five times; the entire decade of the seventies did not see a
single balanced budget.2' Over this same period, federal outlays in-
creased from fifteen percent to twenty-three percent of gross national
product.22 Not coincidentally, the end of this period found the federal
government engaged in some of the deepest and most volatile economic
difficulties in the history of this nation.23 As a consequence, the pro-
posed amendment to the United States Constitution, which speaks to
both the concern with deficits and the increasingly burdensome level of
spending, is now receiving the attention it deserves from the body poli-
tic, including scholars and the media. 4
The more closely the proposed amendment is examined, the more
respect it generates. It is the result of a long, thoughtful, and thor-
oughly scholarly process; it approaches, and perhaps achieves, a perfect
balance between the ideal and the real. A careful examination of the
amendment reveals that it would reestablish the fiscal norms lost in the
evolution of modern budgetary decisionmaking. 25 It would allow for
17. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 151,supra note 7, at 17-18. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-272, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (78 Stat) 22, stated: "[T]o further the objective
of obtaining balanced budgets in the near future, Congress by this action, recognizes the
importance of taking all reasonable means to restrain Government spending ....
18. 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 36,273 (1973).
19. 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H7710 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
20. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S3997 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979).
21. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, UNITED STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF:
FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 76.
22. S. REP. No. 151, supra note 7, at 36.
23. Id at 38-41.
24. See, e.g., ConstitutionalAmendment to Balance the Budget: Bearings on S.J Res. 126
Before the Senate Comma on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980).
25. Id at 3-4.
flexibility in case of national emergency and, most importantly, would
provide the parameters within which future budgetary decisions would
be made. A closer look at the amendment reveals an important link to
the original intent of the Framers.
II. Reestablishing Fiscal Norms
The amendment would effectively reintroduce four fiscal norms
into the Constitution. First, planned (budgeted) federal outlays should
be no greater than planned federal receipts; that is, the Congress should
not plan a deficit. Second, planned receipts should not grow more rap-
idly than the underlying general economy; that is, the burden of federal
taxation should not grow from year to year. Third, actual federal out-
lays should be no greater than planned outlays. Fourth, implicit in the
first three, actual federal outlays should not grow more rapidly than the
underlying general economy; that is, the burden of federal spending
should not grow from year to year.
26
While reintroducing the fiscal norms that have been the sine qua
non of fiscal responsibility, the proposed amendment nevertheless
would provide Congress with flexibility to accommodate change.
Planned federal receipts could be allowed to grow more rapidly than
the economy, but only if an absolute majority in Congress agreed each
year on the requisite tax law. Congress could plan a deficit, but only if
three-fifths of the membership of each House agreed each year that
circumstances warranted violation of the fiscal norm. The burden of
federal spending could grow more rapidly than the general economy,
but only if a congressional consensus annually existed either to violate
the constitutional norm of balance between taxing and spending or to
violate the constitutional norm of limited taxation.
The higher voting requirements and the necessity of reexamining
the spending, taxing, and deficit issues each year mean that a continu-
ing consensus in Congress would have to be maintained to violate the
constitutional norms over time. 7 Whenever that consensus broke
down, the norms in the proposed constitutional amendment automati-
cally would bind Congress. Since violation of these norms would re-
quire members of Congress to "take a stand," a consensus also would
have to be maintained in the larger body politic.
Contrast this proposal with present constitutional law and congres-
sional practice. Laws providing for increasingly burdensome taxing,
26. S. RER. No. 151, supra note 7, at 43-44.
27. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2892 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1981).
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spending, and deficits are adopted "in perpetuity." To halt the growth
of government, a consensus must emerge pressuring the Congress to
enact new law. The difficulties inherent in reasserting fiscal responsi-
bility are illustrated dramatically by the current budgetary turmoil in
Congress.
III. Critics of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Critics of the proposed amendment may be classified into one or
more of three camps.28 In the first are those who applaud the expan-
sion of the federal sector over the last fifty years, including those who
seek to transform America into a socialist state.29 This expansion
clearly is contrary to wishes of the vast majority of Americans as ex-
pressed in elections and survey polls.
30
In the second camp are those who, while decrying this expansion
of government, oppose any amendment which does not dictate a re-
trenchment of federal taxing and spending and an end to inflation-pro-
ducing deficits.31 These critics fail to appreciate that the Constitution
establishes decisionmakingprocesses, and not results. They also should
note that the proposed amendment is compatible with the emergence of
a new consensus for a smaller federal sector; each fiscally conservative
Congress would establish a smaller federal share of the economy that
would persist unless and until an extraordinary consensus appeared to
approve a larger share. Furthermore, the amendment was drafted so as
to provide Congress with an incentive to end inflation through the sim-
ple expedient of linking the current fiscal year statement to the growth
of national income in the prior calendar year. Under the amendment,
28. For a general discussion of some of the main arguments, see A. SCALIA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL ASPECTS OF SJR 58/HRJR 350, THE TAX LIMITATION/BALANCED BUDGET
AMENDMENT (1982); Ippolito, A Formula Solution, in CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING (A Twen-
tieth Century Fund Report 1981); Staff Memorandum to David Stockman, Director, U.S.
Office of Management & Budget, reprinted as 0fB Lists Ten Mfajor Flaws of Constitutional
Amendmentfor Balanced Budget, in 128 CONG. REc. S9371-73 (1982); Ackley, You Can't
Balance the Budget by Amendment, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1982 at 4; Morrow, An Amend-
ment That Should Not Pass, 120 TIME 20, Aug. 9, 1982; Stubblebine & Uhler, A Giant Step
for Fiscal Repair: ConstitutionalAmendment Will Foster Balanced Budgets, L.A. Times, May
30, 1982, at IV, col. 5-3.
29. Michael Harrington has been a prominent advocate of the Socialist cause. See gen-
erally M. HARRINGTON, SOCIALISM (1972).
30. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & GALLUP ORGANIZATION SURVEY, PUBLIC ATTI-
TUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC RIGHTS (Sept. 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S7996-97
(1982).
31. See e.g., SENATE BUDGET COMM. & CONG. RESEARCH LETTER STUDIES ON BAL-
ANCED BUDGET, reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S2445-51 (1979).
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inflation in the prior year would mean less real federal taxing and
spending during the succeeding fiscal year.
The amendment eschews mandating equality between the reve-
nues actually received by the federal treasury and statement receipts.
Such a mandate would present the Congress and the Administration
with an impossible task. Under the proposed amendment, Congress
can guarantee that actual spending does not exceed planned spending;
Congress cannot guarantee that actual revenues will be equal to
planned revenues.
In the third camp are those who, while faulting the present fiscal
regime, believe either that amending the Constitution to promote fiscal
responsibility is inappropriate or that the proposed amendment is inap-
propriate.32 Such opposition comes in seven forms. One comes from
those who believe that the only response to the present situation is elec-
tion of "responsible" representatives.33 These opponents fail to appreci-
ate that the Congress is now, and has been, populated largely by well
intentioned, responsible individuals, many of whom have come to un-
derstand that they are caught up in a process which leads them to join
in approving higher taxes, higher spending, and larger deficits. The
history of fiscal irresponsibility is, in large part, the consequence of a
defective institutional setting, which the proposed amendment would
correct.
A second form of opposition comes from those who believe that
the amendment represents an unwarranted intrusion into the fiscal
powers of Congress.34 They forget that the fundamental purpose of a
constitution is to restrain legislative majorities and that the Constitu-
tion, both in its original and in its present casting, contains various "fis-
cal" provisions.35 These critics also may fail to appreciate that the
32. See, e.g., Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Con-
vention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 1627 (1979).
33. See, e.g., Economists' Open Letter Opposing a Constitutional Amendment Requir-
ing Balanced Federal Budgets and Limiting Federal Tax Receipts, reprinted in 128 CONG.
REc. S8113-14 (1982); Address by President Ford, Claremont Men's College (Dec. 5, 1980).
34. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. S8564-68 (1982) (statement of Sen. Cranston); AMEND-
MENT 2005 to S.J. REs. 58, 128 CONG. REc. S9392-407 (1982) (introduced by Sens. Gorton
& Rudman).
35. For example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states that: "The Congress shall have the
Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Impost and Excises, to pay the Debts ... of the
United States; ... To borrow money on the credit of the United States; ... To coin
Money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign Coin;..."
Section 9 prohibits money from being drawn from the Treasury without appropriations
made by law. Id at § 9.
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amendment would be conducive to orderly and constructive conduct of
the nation's fiscal responsibilities.
A third form comes from those who would rely on statutory re-
form of the budget process, 36 especially reform of the 1974 Budget
Act.37 This opposition fails to reckon with the rule that what one Con-
gress can enact into law, a subsequent Congress can repeal, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly.38 The Ninety-fifth Congress adopted legislation
requiring a balanced budget39 which subsequent Congresses repealed
"by implication" each time they adopted unbalanced budgets. Statutes
and "rules of Congress" cannot cure fundamental defects in the Consti-
tution. Moreover, the amendment would motivate Congress to adopt
the changes in its practices that its critics believe would be desireable.
Those who take issue with specific aspects of the proposed amend-
ment compose a fourth form of opposition.40 They claim that certain
terms used in the amendment-such as "receipts," "outlays," and "na-
tional income"-are so lacking in clarity that the Congress would ride
roughshod over their intended application. Yet, as part of the control-
ling "legislative history," the detailed interpretation by the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee makes clear that the amendment permits considerable
latitude in application while effectively promoting fiscal responsibil-
ity.4 1 These opponents also fail to appreciate that, by their standard of
clarity, each and every provision of the Constitution drafted by the
Founding Fathers would be rejected, including the entire Bill of
Rights. Of necessity, constitutions are mere collections of words until
application gives them life. By implication, it appears that these oppo-
nents do not believe that members of Congress respond constructively
36. See, e.g., Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Balance the Budget and Limit Fed-
eral Spending: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial Law of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 299 (1981-82) (statement of Laurence
H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School) reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S9624 (1982);
AMENDMENT 1167/2009 TO S.J. RES. 58, 128 CONG. REc. S9529-92, S9613-14 (1982) (intro-
duced by Sen. Dodd); 128 CONG. REC. S9302-04 (1982) (statement by Sen. Kennedy).
37. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-3444,
88 Stat. 297 (1974).
38. See J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 34-36 (2d
ed. 1975).
39. Pub. L. No. 95-435, 92 Stat. 1051 (1978) contained an amendment to an Interna-
tional Monetary Fund loan program authorization measure requiring that, beginning in fis-
cal year 1981, total budget outlays of the federal government "shall not" exceed its receipts.
40. See, e.g., Economists' Open Letter, supra note 33; Wildawsky, Does Federal Spend-
ing Constitute a "Discovered Fault" in the ConstitutionZ reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. 58017-
23 (1982).
41. S. REP. No. 151, supra note 7, at 43-60.
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to their constitutional obligations. Yet, were this the case, the Constitu-
tion long ago would have become a dead letter.
Opposition also comes from those who argue that the amendment
would entice Congress to respond perversely.42 These critics argue, for
example, that restraining the growth of federal taxing and spending
could pressure the Congress to rely more heavily on regulation of the
private sector. Such regulation inevitably reduces the real growth of
the economy.43 Under the amendment, however, slower real growth
would be translated into slower real federal spending. Thus, a Con-
gress seeking a steady flow of revenues would be unlikely to unduly
hamper private sector growth.
A sixth form comes from those who believe that the amendment is
impractical, either on economic or administrative grounds. 4 These op-
ponents fail to appreciate that the amendment would accommodate,
but not require, countercyclical fiscal policy.45 They also fail to appre-
ciate that states such as California have administered the stricter bal-
anced budget provisions of their constitutions meaningfully and
constructively.46 As implausible as it may be to the Washington estab-
lishment, federal compliance would be no more onerous.
Finally, opposition comes from those who believe that some other
amendment would be more effective-such as one giving the President
an "item veto."'47 However, there is no evidence that the item veto re-
strains either deficit spending or total government spending. Until
Proposition 13, state spending in California grew at a rapid rate in spite
42. See, e.g., Memorandum to Sen. Alan Cranston from Charles L. Schultz, reprinted as
Ways that the Budget Process can be Subverted as the Congress and the Executive Try to Find
Loopholes in the Balanced Budget Amendment, in 128 CONG. REc. S9390-91 (1982); 128
CONG. REc. S9389-390 (1982) (statement of Sen. Chafee); Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ment to Balance the Federal Budget: Hearings on SJ Res. 56 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comn on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979).
43. See, e.g., R. AMACHER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 167, 207 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Will, Balanced Budget Hoax, Wash. Post, July 25, 1982, B7, col. 4; re-
printed in 129 CONG. REc. S9389-390 (1982) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
45. S. FISCHER & R. DORNBUSCH, ECONOMICS 295 (1983).
46. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 provides that: "(a) Within the first 10 days of each calen-
dar year, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature, with an explanatory message, a
budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing itemized statements for recommended state
expenditures and estimated state revenues. If recommended expenditures exceed estimated
revenues, the Governor shall recommend the sources from which the additional revenues
should be provided."
47. Penner, The Nonsense Amendment, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1982, at F3, col. 1;
AMENDMENT 2001 to SJ. RES. 58, 128 CONG. REC. 59410, 59470 (1982) (introduced by
Sens. Dixon & Proxmire).
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of a constitutional provision giving the Governor an item veto.48 Ron-
ald Reagan's experiences as Governor of California led him to initiate
the first constitutional tax/spending limit movement.49 His experiences
as President are leading him to support this amendment.50
Conclusion: Time for Constitutional Repair
Justification for the amendment lies in the congressional fiscal ir-
responsibility that has come to burden this nation at least since the end
of World War II. The history of an increasingly onerous tax burden,
budgets evermore in deficit, inflation and high interest rates, declining
rates of saving and investment, and declining rates of real economic
growth is too well known to bear detailing here. Against this history,
the American people have two choices: to permit, with occasional in-
terruption, continuation of the deterioration of the last forty years or to
begin repair of the constitutional defects which have become manifest.
The balanced budget amendment would be a reasonable and construc-
tive response.
48. Balancing the Budget: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comrm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, 67 (May 29, 1981).
49. Id at 60.
50. See Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1982, at A2, col. 1, A4, col. 1.
